Pepperdine Policy Review
Volume 5

Article 7

4-20-2012

“It’s all Political, but Public Policy is Irrational”
Jaquelyn King
Pepperdine University, Jaquelyn.King@pepperdine.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr
Part of the Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons

Recommended Citation
King, Jaquelyn (2012) "“It’s all Political, but Public Policy is Irrational”," Pepperdine Policy Review: Vol. 5,
Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr/vol5/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Public Policy at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Policy Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

PEPPERDINE POLICY REVIEW VOLUME V – SPRING 2012

“It’s all Political, but Public Policy is Irrational”
Jacquelyn King

California’s prison system has long been known as one that is very overcrowded and costly to
taxpayers. As of 2009, the prison population has been about 169,000, with 24.2% of male new
admissions being drug offenders, and 30% of female new admissions being classified as drug
offenders (Year at a Glance 2010). Each prisoner costs taxpayers around $46,000 annually
(Proposition 5 2008). The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
admits that substance abuse programs are needed in order to reduce recidivism for drug
offenders, but the 2009-2010 Corrections budget alone reduced rehabilitation programs by a total
of $250 million (Year at a Glance 2010). According to the CDCR 2010 report, “The return to
custody rate after two years for offenders completing both in-prison and community-based
treatment in fiscal year 2005-2006 was 35.3% compared to 54.2% for all offenders” (Year at a
Glance 2010). If the CDCR knows that substance abuse programs can help keep drug offenders
out of prison, why are drug offenders in prison instead of these programs? Simply put, the
answer is that “it’s all political, but public policy is irrational” (Zimmerman 2011). This paper
will discuss the politics behind drug policy and incarceration by first providing an overview of
the policy issue, a look at possible reforms, problems in attaining reform, and conclude with
policy implications.
POLICY ISSUE: INCARCERATION AND DRUG POLICY
Historically, one of the main changes in drug policy, leading to high incarceration rates
for drug offenders, has been the War on Drugs movement of the 1970s and 1980s. In 1986,
Congress passed legislation that gave “harsh mandatory sentences for possession of even small
amounts of crack cocaine” (Rudolf 2011). Under this law, possession of five grams of crack
cocaine, led to an immediate five-year prison term (Rudolf 2011). This drug policy spurred a
racially charged debate for decades over the fairness of sentencing drug offenders in possession
of drugs that are common to poor, inter-city neighborhoods (Rudolf 2011). Since the
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implementation of these federal sentencing guidelines, the Sentencing Project reports that
“African American drug offenders have a 20% greater chance of being sentenced to prison than
white drug offenders, and Hispanics a 40% greater chance” (The Federal Prison Population: A
Statistical Analysis n.d.). Additionally, sentences for drug offenders increased from an average
of thirty-three months in 1992 to forty-three months in 2002. (The Federal Prison Population: A
Statistical Analysis n.d.) This approach of heavily criminalizing drug behaviors would have
major implications for future policies.
Moving forward to the present in California, the most recent prison reform with
implications for non-violent drug offenders, is the prison realignment legislation. Assembly Bill
109 is the legislation that shifts the responsibility for low-level offenders from the state to
counties (Smith 2011). This bill “realigns” the prison population by taking these offenders and
simply moving them from state prisons to county jails. As previously mentioned, California has
a total prison population upwards of 160,000. Out of these prisoners, about 28,000 are drug
offenders, with 9,000 of them in prison for simple drug offenses (Smith 2011). These offenders
alone are estimated at costing the state about $450 million per year, which does not include
offenders who are returned to prison for various violations (Smith 2011). The realignment
legislation has huge implications for this population, as non-violent drug offenders would be
targeted to move out of prisons to jails. The concern surrounding this reform is one often voiced
by the Drug Policy Alliance organization. Margaret Dooley-Sammuli, deputy state director in
Southern California for the Drug Policy Alliance, claims that “the plan doesn’t include a dime
for drug treatment or mental health care. In fact, the governor has proposed reducing funds for
those services” (Smith 2011).
Studies consistently show that “states that increased the incarceration of drug offenders
did not necessarily experience a corresponding decline in drug use” (Przybylski 2009). For
example, New Jersey’s prison population showed that drug offenders accounted for the largest
proportion (Przybylski 2009). However, when drug offender admissions increased by 29% in
the 1990s, drug use also increased (Przybylski 2009). As a reform in New Jersey, lawmakers got
rid of an old drug policy that required three-year minimum prison sentences for offenders selling
drugs within 1,000 feet of a school (Rudolf 2011). Even though this move was somewhat
controversial, New Jersey has still been able to reduce prison populations by 20% over the last
decade, due in large part to cutting sentences for drug offenders (Rudolf 2011). While cutting
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sentences for drug offenders is one way to reduce prison populations, it does little to rehabilitate
these individuals.
CHANCE FOR REFORM: PROP 36
A major reform in California that dealt with incarceration for drug offenders was the
Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act, Proposition 36, that was passed in 2000 (California
Proposition 36 n.d.). This proposition changed California law, allowing first and second time,
nonviolent, simple drug possession offenders to receive treatment over incarceration (California
Proposition 36 n.d.). When Prop. 36 was passed, it was fueled by $120 million in funding for
treatment over the course of five years (California Proposition 36 n.d.). This funding dropped to
$100 million by 2006 (Zimmerman 2011). During this time, about 36,000 people per year
entered treatment programs through provisions of Prop. 36 (California Proposition 36 n.d.). In a
cost-benefit analysis performed by the University of California, Los Angeles, it was concluded
that a total of $1.5 billion was saved due to this legislation (California Proposition 36 n.d.).
Legislation that involves treatment over incarceration is also favored by the public, as one survey
shows that 63% of Americans support counseling and treatment as means of addressing drug
abuse, rather than incarceration (California Proposition 36 n.d.). Funding for this proposition
ended in 2007 with a vote by California Senate Republicans who blocked additional funding
even though the bill saved $2.50 for every dollar invested (California Proposition 36 n.d.).
Because of this, Proposition 36 has no funding today, even though it was seen as a major success
in rehabilitating drug offenders.
AN EXPERT PERSPECTIVE
In an interview with drug policy expert, Bill Zimmerman, I was able to gain some
insight into the complexities surrounding sentencing laws for drug offenders. The interview
started off with looking at cost estimates and overall success from the proposition. According to
Zimmerman, drug treatment costs averaged at about $3,000-$4,000 per person per year,
depending on the level of treatment that was needed (Zimmerman 2011). This represents only a
fraction of the cost involved for one year in a state prison. After the passage of Prop. 36, about
one-third of eligible offenders entered and completed treatment programs; one-third entered and
never completed the programs; and, one-third did not enter the programs.
Much of the debate surrounding overcrowded prisons (due to sentencing) and the amount
of drug offenders that add to the overcrowding, is centered around the three-strikes law in
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California. This law stipulates life sentences for third strikers of felony crimes, which may or
may not include drug offenders. For Bill Zimmerman, the three-strikes is only a partial part of
the problem for overcrowding by drug offenses that are counted as felonies (Zimmerman 2011).
The real problem of prison overcrowding is due to the drug laws enacted in the 1970s and 1980s
which criminalized drug behavior. (Zimmerman 2011)
In 2008, Proposition 5, similar to Prop. 36, was put before the voters to approve
expanding drug offenders’ treatment program. This proposition would have provided much
higher funding than Prop. 36, as it was set to allocated $460 million per year “to improve and
expand treatment programs for persons convicted of drug and other offenses” (Proposition 5
2008). In addition, this legislation would “limit court authority to incarcerate offenders who
commit certain drug crimes, break drug treatment rules or violate parole,” and would have
“increased state costs potentially exceeding $1 billion annually primarily for expansion of
offender treatment programs” (Proposition 5 2008). However, though the legislation would have
been costly, savings to the state would have exceeded the costs, according to the Legislative
Analyst (Proposition 5 2008).
Bill Zimmerman was also a major proponent of Prop. 5, and unfortunately, since this bill
was defeated, has not been focusing efforts towards drug policies that deal with incarceration
(Zimmerman 2011). He said that there are no immediate plans to put this initiative back on the
ballot because initiatives cost around $2 million just to get on the ballot (Zimmerman 2011).
Originally, Prop. 5 was backed financially by several philanthropists, but after the bill failed, this
source of funding was lost (Zimmerman 2011). Now, with the prison realignment legislation in
place, Zimmerman also claims that this law would affect sentencing for new drug offenders,
where these offenders would likely be sent to jails over prisons because jails are less costly
(Zimmerman 2011). Then, offenders who committed non-violent drug felonies are likely to be
released early, without receiving treatment (Zimmerman 2011). After asking Zimmerman, what
kind of reform would be most beneficial to California to address drug offenders in the prison
system, if funding were not a detriment, Zimmerman responded that California would need an
expansion of the Prop. 36 program (Zimmerman 2011). Under Prop. 58,000 per year would
have entered treatment programs, up from the 35,000 per year served under Prop. 36
(Zimmerman 2011). Such a plan would likely cost between $500-$700million annually
(Zimmerman 2011).
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Unfortunately, even though Prop. 36 had several successes, there is no more funding for
this legislation today (Zimmerman 2011). However, the change in the criminal law is still on the
books: first and second time offender cannot be incarcerated but there is no funding to send these
individuals to treatment either (Zimmerman 2011). As a result, these offenders are encouraged
to elect going to programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous (Zimmerman 2011). Treatment
programs that were needed under Prop. 5, were defeated primarily due to the prison guard union
backing all of the money that opposed Prop. 5 (Zimmerman 2011). In order to win this fight, the
only way is to obtain financial backing that exceeds this union’s efforts (Zimmerman 2011).
POLICY IMPLICATIONS/CONCLUSIONS
As the title claims, “public policy is irrational,” especially when it comes to the
relationship between drug policies and incarceration. The focus in California right now is not to
establish more treatment programs for drug offenders, but is instead to reduce prison populations
by simply moving these offenders into jails through prison realignment. As mentioned, there is
also the problem with first and second-time simple offenders who are not to be sent to jail, but
are also not sent to treatment programs, thus remaining in a “limbo,” stuck in the system.
Overall, reform that is moving forward is weak at best as “Governor Brown and the legislature
have attempted to craft a fix, but the fix will leave the system just as broken as ever” (Smith
2011). The realignment is an example of a policy that readjusts, but does not deal with drug
problems in this state (Zimmerman 2011).
Knowing that an effective reform is needed, what are the policy implications for the
future? As Bill Zimmerman argues, it is difficult for any successful reform to take place when
drug policies have been so irrational, criminalizing behavior instead of treating them. A passage
of Proposition 5 would be the most successful reform for California, as it expands upon
Proposition 36, that already had successes. Even the federal government is moving towards
reform, as new guidelines were approved that would reduce sentencing disparities between
powder and crack cocaine, and “eliminate mandatory sentences for possession of small amounts
of crack” (Rudolf 2011). Such a move would save the federal government $200 million over
five years (Rudolf 2011). As previously stated, states such as New Jersey have been issuing drug
reforms as well. Until attitudes in California change, to allow initiatives such as Proposition 5 to
pass, there may not be plausible changes for incarcerating drug offenders. However, if the
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federal government, as well as other states, can move towards reform, California should have no
problem in acquiring reform once again in the way drug offenders are sentenced.
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